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Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance?
Yu-Chu Shen and Sharon K. Long
Objective. We investigate the factors driving the downward trend in employer
sponsored health insurance (ESI) coverage between 1999 and 2002 for low- and middle-
income workers, and assess their insurance options in the absence of ESI coverage.
Data. We use the 1999 and 2002 rounds of the National Survey of America’s Families
(NSAF), supplemented with ESI premiums from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, as well as other state- and county-level data from a variety of sources. The
sample includes workers between the ages of 19 and 64.
Study Design. We first estimate linear probability models of the probability of having
an ESI offer and, for those with an offer, the probability of taking up ESI coverage, using
two-stage least square regression on the 2002 worker sample. We then use Oaxaca–
Blinder regression-based decomposition methods to identify the factors that explain the
changes in ESI offer and take-up between 1999 and 2002.
Principal Findings. We find that while low-income workers are more likely to be
uninsured and are most vulnerable to the loss of ESI coverage, many middle-income
workers are also in a precarious position when faced with the loss of ESI coverage. Many
low- and middle-income workers have few coverage options in the absence of ESI. This
is particularly problematic for low-income workers: only 13 percent have a spouse with
an ESI offer and the nongroup premium they face increased at a much higher rate than
for middle-income workers. Finally, we find that the drop in ESI offers between 1999
and 2002 was driven largely by changes in nature of the workers’ jobs, while the drop in
ESI take-up was driven largely by rising ESI premiums.
Conclusions. Policies that shore up the ESI system are important for both low- and
middle-income workers, as both are vulnerable to a loss of insurance coverage in the
absence of ESI. Over time, the potential coverage options available to low- and middle-
income workers in the absence of ESI have narrowed as nongroup premiums have
increased. While public coverage has provided some protection from that increase for
low-income workers, middle-income workers are much less likely to have access to
public protection.
Key Words. Employer sponsored health insurance, premiums, low-income work-
ers
r Health Research and Educational Trust
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6773.2006.00590.x
2074
Although the majority of Americans receive their health insurance through an
employment-based health plan, that number is declining as health insurance
premiums rise, the share of the premium that is passed on to employees rises,
and fewer firms offer coverage to their workers (Fronstin 2003). The decline in
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) is not limited to low-income workers——
the group that is often the focus of public concern and policy debate——but is
also occurring among middle-income workers. As we show below, between
1999 and 2002, the share of workers with ESI coverage dropped 3 percentage
points for both low-income workers (defined as those with family income less
than 200 percent of the federal poverty level [FPL]) and middle-income
workers (defined as those with family income between 200 and 400 percent of
FPL).
Numerous studies document a widespread decline in ESI in the late
1990s (Cunningham 2002; Fronstin 2003; Holahan 2003; Long and Shen
2004). In addition, many studies focus on the role of premiums in workers’
decision to participate in ESI coverage. For example, Cutler (2002) found that
the decline of ESI coverage was largely because of a decline in take-up rather
than employers deciding to stop offering insurance, and that the decline in
take-up was mainly because of rising premiums. Chernew, Frick, and
McLaughlin (1997) and Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) also found
higher premiums associated with a lower rate of ESI take-up among low-
income workers. Aside from the emphasis on ESI premiums, there has been
little research providing a systematic analysis of the factors that are behind the
current downward trend. Understanding these factors can influence the role of
state and federal government in regulating the health insurance market. In a
recent paper, Chernew et al. (2005) reported that rising ESI premiums ac-
counted for over half of the decline in overall insurance coverage rate and that
changes in economic and demographic factors had little net effect. That
study, which focused on 61 large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), did
not examine whether the determinants differed between the offer decision and
take-up decision of insurance coverage.
In this paper, we use data from the National Survey of America’s Fam-
ilies (NSAF) to examine the factors driving the changes in the offer and take-up
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of ESI for low- and middle-income workers between 1999 and 2002——a period
of economic boom to recession.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We rely on a standard model of the demand for health insurance coverage
(IOM 2001). Individuals choose among:
 ESI coverage through their own employer, if it is available,
 ESI coverage through a spouse or other family member, if it is
available,
 coverage in the nongroup market,
 public coverage, if they are eligible, or
 remaining uninsured.
For each individual, their insurance coverage decision will be a function
of their personal characteristics (including their health status and health care
needs), the coverage options that are available to them, the costs of each of
those options (e.g., premiums, deductibles, copays), and their tastes and pref-
erences for insurance. For workers who are offered ESI by their employers, we
expect ESI coverage to be lower for those who face higher costs under their
ESI plan, have access to coverage through a spouse or other family member,
and are eligible for public coverage, all else equal. For workers who do not
have an ESI offer, we would expect uninsurance to be higher for those who
face higher costs in the nongroup market, are not eligible for public coverage,
and do not have the option for coverage via a family member. We provide a
detailed model specification in the Methods section.
DATA
This study relies on the 1999 and 2002 rounds of the NSAF, supplemented
with state and county-level data from a variety of sources. NSAF provides
detailed economic, health, and social characteristics for a representative sam-
ple of almost 45,000 families. Of particular relevance to this study, the NSAF
oversamples low-income families and has a nationally representative sample
of middle-income workers as well. We use the 1999 and 2002 rounds of the
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NSAF to study the shift in insurance coverage during this period. Our sample
includes workers between the age of 19 and 64.
The overall response rates for the 1999 and 2002 rounds of NSAF were
64 and 52 percent, respectively. For each year, responses to the interviews
were weighted to adjust for the oversampling of low-income families, survey
nonresponse, and other survey design issues (Brick et al. 2002). Because of the
complex design of the NSAF, we rely on a jackknife replication method to
obtain accurate variance estimates (Flores-Cervantes, Brick, and DiGaetano
1999).
As noted earlier, we define low-income workers as those with family
incomes below 200 percent of FPL for the prior year, and middle-income
workers as those with family incomes between 200 and 400 percent of FPL.
The low-income (middle-income) workers represent 20 (33) percent of all
workers. We exclude self-employed workers from the analysis because our
focus is on workers who have the potential of being offered and taking up ESI
coverage. Self-employed workers were 12 percent of the worker sample.
Lastly, we exclude a handful of workers who reported having no ESI offer
from their current employer but reported that they were ESI policyholders.
These are most likely retired workers or workers with COBRA (Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) coverage.
We supplement the NSAF data with information from other sources on
the local labor and health care markets for the individual’s state and county of
residence, including information on eligibility for public insurance programs,
and ESI and nongroup premiums. We use the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) to obtain state level, firm-size specific ESI premium measures.
We use the Area Resource File to obtain county characteristics such as
population, per capita income, number of physicians per capita, and Medicare
payment rates. Managed care penetration data are obtained from Inter-
study. We use data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual
survey, a hospital-level dataset, to construct county-level measures of the sup-
ply of hospital beds. Lastly we obtained area hospital wage index and Medi-
care per capita spending from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services.
METHODS
We begin by showing how insurance coverage, especially ESI offer and take-
up, in 2002 compares to coverage in 1999 for all workers and for workers by
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income group. We then use Oaxaca–Blinder regression-based decomposition
methods (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) to identify the factors that explain the
changes in ESI offer and take-up over this period. Although originally devel-
oped to examine gender wage gaps, this method has been used in a number of
recent studies looking at changes in insurance coverage over time (e.g., Acs
1995; Shen and Zuckerman 2003) and racial disparities in health care access
and use (Hargraves and Hadley 2003).
Using the change in the offer rate between 1999 and 2002 as our
example, equation (1) shows the change in the share of workers with an
ESI offer (Y ) in 2002 and 1999, evaluated at the yearly means of the
independent variables, X, and their corresponding effect on offer rate (the
coefficient, b).
Y 2002  Y 1999 ¼ X 02002b^2002  X
0
1999b^1999 ð1Þ
By adding and subtracting X 1999b^2002 and rearranging the terms in (1), we can
obtain the following relationship:
Y 2002  Y 1999 ¼ ðX 2002  X 1999Þ0b^2002 þ X 01999ðb^2002  b^1999Þ ð2Þ
The observed change in offer rate thus can be decomposed into two com-
ponents: the first part of equation (2) represents changes that can be explained
by shifts over time in the characteristics of the workers, their jobs and their
communities, and the ESI premium that they face; the second part of equation
(2) represents changes because of differences in how these observed factors
affect a person’s probability of having an ESI offer and other factors not
captured in the model.1 We apply the same method of decomposition for the
ESI take-up model. We obtain standard errors for the Oaxaca–Blinder de-
composition estimates using the unbiased asymptotic variance methods pro-
posed by Jann (2005).
To obtain estimates of the b’s, we estimate a linear probability model of
the probability of having an ESI offer (or taking up an ESI offer) using two-
stage least square regression on the 2002 worker sample.2 We adopt this two-
stage approach instead of the usual ordinary least square (OLS) regression so
that we can obtain consistent estimates of the effects of Medicaid eligibility and
nongroup premiums (details below). We estimate the equation separately for
low- and middle-income workers. The offer equation includes all workers in
our sample. The take-up equation only includes workers who have an ESI
offer.
Building on our conceptual model, the likelihood of a worker having an
ESI offer or taking up that offer is assumed to be a function of:
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 Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the worker: We capture a
worker’s taste and preference for insurance through a set of demo-
graphic, socioeconomic, and preference variables. These include
age, gender, race/ethnicity, self-reported health status is fair or poor,
whether the individual has a health condition that limits his or her
ability to work, education, family structure (marital status, number of
children), and two self-reported measures of economic hardship
(whether the worker’s family has difficulty paying bills or experi-
ences food insecurity).3 Preference for insurance is also influenced by
the degree of risk aversion. We constructed a risk aversion indicator
using a self-reported question that indicates whether the worker is
more likely to take risks than the average person. The binary risk
aversion indicator takes on a value of 1 if the person reports that he or
she is more likely to take risks than the average person and 0 oth-
erwise.
 Characteristics of the worker’s employment: These measures include
whether the individual has worked full-time at the same employer for
at least 1 year, whether the individual has worked full-time at the
same employer for less than 1 year, and whether the individual has
worked part-time at the same employer for at least 1 year (the omit-
ted category is working part-time at the same employer for less than 1
year).
 Characteristics of the worker’s job: To capture the variation in ESI offer
rates across industry and firm size we include seven industry cate-
gories and five firm size categories (see Table 2 for a description of
each category).
 The ESI premium faced by the worker: We include a state-level firm-size
specific measure of the ESI premium faced by each worker. For the
offer equation, we include the total ESI premium (log transformed)
and the share of the total premium (in percentage terms) paid by a
typical employer of that firm size in that state. For the take-up equa-
tion, we include the worker’s contribution toward the ESI premium
(log transformed). Details on these premium measures are provided
in the Key Variable Construction section.
 The availability of ESI alternatives to the worker: Without ESI, an in-
dividual’s coverage options narrow to obtaining coverage through a
family member’s job, purchasing nongroup insurance, or enrolling
in a public program (for those who are eligible). We capture these
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alternative sources of coverage by including indicators of whether
the worker is eligible for public programs and the nongroup premi-
um the worker is likely to face in the individual market (log trans-
formed). We provide more details on how we estimate the public
eligibility indicator and nongroup premium in the Key Variable
Construction section. If the worker has a spouse or a partner, we
capture whether the spouse works, whether the spouse works full-
time, and whether the spouse has ESI offer. It should be noted that
we were not able to capture the availability of an ESI offer from
family members other than a spouse. To the extent that young
workers could obtain coverage through their parents, we underes-
timate the availability of ESI-dependent coverage.
 Characteristics of the worker’s community: We capture both the charac-
teristics of the health care provider market and the health care costs
in the county where the worker lives. These variables include the
local area wage index, the managed care penetration rate in county,
the number of physicians per capita in the county, the percent of
physicians in the county who are in general/family practice, the
number of hospital beds per capita in the county, the percent of
hospital beds that are in public hospitals in the county, whether
county is part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), Census
region, and 13 NSAF state indicators.
It should be noted that in this model, we are not able to capture job
mobility if a firm stops offering ESI coverage. To the extent that workers are
able to move to firms that continue to offer ESI, our estimates will overstate the
increase in uninsurance as a result of losing an ESI offer. However, we would
argue that it is unlikely that significant shares of workers, particularly low-
income workers in an economic downturn, would be able to move to new jobs
that have ESI coverage.
We also do not have information on the relative generosity of the ESI
health plan (e.g., covered services, deductibles, and copayments). A worker
might not take an ESI offer if the benefit package and cost-sharing require-
ments offered was deemed insufficient. We use firm size as a proxy for the
generosity of the ESI health plan, as large firms offer somewhat more generous
benefits than smaller firms (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research
and Educational Trust 2002).
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KEY VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
There are five key variables to be constructed for this study: a measure of each
individual’s current health insurance coverage, a measure of whether the in-
dividual’s employer offers insurance coverage to workers, the ESI premium
faced by the individual, the nongroup premium faced by the individual, and
the individual’s eligibility for public coverage.
Insurance Status
In constructing the first measure, we use information on reported health in-
surance coverage at the time of the survey to classify each individual into one
of five mutually exclusive groups, ordered hierarchically. The order of the
hierarchy is: (1) ESI through own employer, (2) ESI through another family
member (e.g., spouse or parent), (3) Medicaid, State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP), or any state-specific program, (4) coverage
through the nongroup market, and (5) uninsured. The small number of in-
dividuals (1.3 percent in our sample) who reported that they had both ESI and
public coverage were classified as having ESI.
ESI Offer
To identify individuals working in a firm that offers ESI coverage, we con-
structed an offer status indicator that takes the value of 1 if the person reported
having ESI through his or her own employer, or if the person answered ‘‘yes’’
to the survey question, ‘‘Does your current employer offer health insurance to
workers in the same position as yours?’’ The indicator takes a value of 0
otherwise.4
The NSAF offer question seeks information about the type of job that the
person holds, not about the person’s own particular experience. Consequent-
ly, individuals can answer ‘‘yes’’ to the question even if they themselves are not
eligible to enroll in their employer’s plan. As a result, the offer rate in the
NSAF will be higher than those based on data sets that focus on whether a
particular individual received an offer. We address this issue by recoding the
offer variable in NSAF to 0 for individuals without ESI coverage who report
that their firm offers coverage to workers in the same position as theirs, but are
likely to be ineligible for that ESI coverage themselves. Those individuals are
persons who have been with their current employer for less than 1 year. This
edit brings the NSAF offer rate closer to that of other surveys such as CPS. If
we were to further restrict the ESI offer to those working full-time, our basic
findings are unchanged.
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In addition, since the offer question was asked in a consistent way in the
1999 and 2002 NSAF surveys, it provides an accurate measure of changes in
offer probabilities over time.
ESI Premiums
It is important to control for the level of ESI premiums in modeling insurance
status. Because NSAF does not collect premium information, we rely on other
data sources to construct measures of the ESI and nongroup premiums faced
by each worker in our sample.
In constructing our measure of ESI premiums, we use data from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 1999 and 2002. Specifically,
MEPS publishes state-level information on total premium and premium
contribution by workers for different firm size categories (o10, 10–24, 25–99,
100–999, and 1,0001 workers). We match these premiums to workers in our
sample based on their firm size and their state of residence. In other words, the
ESI premium assigned to each NSAF worker represents the average ESI pre-
mium this worker would likely face given his or her firm size and state of
residence. An average ESI premium contribution by workers is constructed
using a similar strategy.
For the offer equation, we include the total premium as well as the
employer’s share of the premium. By using total premium in the offer equa-
tion, we are assuming that wages do not adjust to reflect the rising premium.
We believe this is a reasonable assumption given that wages are sticky in the
short run and our analysis period is relatively short.
One concern with the premium measures is that the variation in pre-
miums across states might reflect variations in both prices and utilization. In
order to have premium measures that reflect comparable utilization levels, we
develop a state-specific utilization adjustment factor to standardize our pre-
miums. Specifically, we use total Medicare per capita spending (part A1part
B) as the basis for the adjustment factor. Studies have shown that differences in
the amount and types of care used, rather than population characteristics and
prices, are responsible for much of the variation in Medicare per capita
spending (see a review in Gold 2004). We assign each state an adjustment
factor that is the ratio between the state’s average Medicare per capita
spending and the median Medicare per capita spending in the nation.
We divided our premium by this adjustment factor to get a standardized
premium measure.
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We recognize that the state and firm-size specific premium is an imper-
fect proxy for the actual premium that the worker faces. However, this pre-
mium measure alleviates the possibility of estimation bias that would result
from unobserved individual characteristics affecting both the offer and take-up
decisions and the premiums the worker faces. In an alternative specification,
we used a county-level measure of average ESI premiums (and contributions)
instead of the state level firm-size specific premiums. This measure addresses
the potential estimation bias that would arise if job mobility made firm-size
specific premiums endogenous to the ESI offer and take-up rates (Gruber
2000).5 Our results are robust whether we use the county-level or state-level
firm-size specific measure of ESI premiums. A second concern is that pre-
miums are measured at the aggregate level so the estimated standard errors
will overstate the precision of our estimates when we estimate the offer and
take-up equation at the individual worker level. However, this does not affect
our decomposition results as the decomposition estimates do not depend on
the estimated standard errors.
Nongroup Premium
Workers might be more likely to take a job with an ESI offer or take up an ESI
offer when it is available if their condition is such that they will face a high
nongroup premium. Because observed nongroup premiums in the market are
not likely to reflect the potential nongroup premiums faced by individuals who
do not currently purchase nongroup coverage (Hadley and Reschovsky 2003),
we rely on outside sources to estimate the nongroup premiums that would be
faced by the workers in our sample. Specifically, we apply the framework for
generating nongroup premium estimates developed by Hadley and Reschov-
sky (2003) for the Community Tracking Survey (CTS) to our NSAF data. Had-
ley and Reschovsky generated estimates of nongroup premiums for their CTS
sample through a two-step process. First, they estimated a model of nongroup
premiums using data from the CTS, which collects information on nongroup
premiums for the individuals in the sample who have nongroup coverage. Their
model captures the effect of worker demographics, family structure, job char-
acteristics, nongroup market regulations in the state, and local market charac-
teristics on the individual’s nongroup premium, while controlling for the
unobservable factors that led the individuals to select into the nongroup market
(i.e., they employed a Heckman selection model).6 Second, they then use the
coefficient estimates from the model to predict the nongroup premiums that
would be faced by all members of their sample (regardless of insurance status).
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In estimating nongroup premiums for our sample, we use the coefficient es-
timates from Hadley and Reschovsky’s model and replicate their second step
using NSAF data to obtain estimates of the nongroup premiums that would be
faced by each NSAF worker in our sample.7
Simulating Eligibility for Public Programs
Our measure of eligibility for Medicaid, SCHIP, and other public programs is
obtained from a micro-simulation model developed at the Urban Institute
(Davidoff et al. 2004). Eligibility for each worker is based on the program rules
for Medicaid, SCHIP and, if relevant, other state programs in place in the
worker’s state of residence during the relevant years.8 Because the individual’s
eligibility for public coverage may be endogenously related to the take-up
decision (biasing OLS estimates), we adopt the approach by Cutler and
Gruber (1996). Specifically, we use the percent of a standard adult population
that would have been eligible for Medicaid under each state’s rules as the
instrument for the individual’s eligibility in a two-state least squares model.
The instrumental variables approach will provide consistent coefficient esti-
mates for our decomposition.
RESULTS
In 2002, 83 percent of all working adults were covered through ESI, with most
of those workers covered through their own employer (Table 1). Seventy-nine
percent of the workers received an ESI offer from their employer and 65
percent had ESI coverage from that employer, for an ESI take-up rate of about
82 percent.9 Of the remaining workers, very few relied on public coverage (2.4
percent) or nongroup coverage (2.8 percent), leaving about 12 percent
uninsured.
Not surprisingly, the pattern of insurance coverage was quite different
for workers at different income levels in 2002. Low-income workers with
family incomes less than 200 percent of the FPL were much less likely than
higher income workers to have an ESI offer from their current employer (55
percent) and less likely to take-up an offer when it was available (76 percent).
As a result, many fewer low-income workers had ESI coverage (51 percent).
Although public coverage and nongroup coverage were higher (10 percent
and almost 4 percent, respectively) for the low-income workers, their unin-
surance rate was quite high, at 35 percent, in 2002.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What’s Driving the Downward Trend in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance? 2085
Among higher income workers there are clear gains in coverage as
income rises. The likelihood of an ESI offer increases with income, as does the
ESI take-up rate. Among middle-income workers with family income between
200 and 400 percent of the FPL 83 percent have ESI coverage, compared with
over 95 percent for workers in the highest income group (workers with family
income above 400 percent of the FPL). Consistent with those patterns, un-
insurance also drops rapidly with income: 12 percent of the middle-income
workers were uninsured in 2002 versus only 2 percent of the highest income
workers.
How Did Insurance Coverage Change between 1999 and 2002?
There were significant changes in insurance coverage for workers between
1999 and 2002, although only for the two lowest income groups. ESI coverage
dropped about 3 percentage points for both the low- and middle-income
workers. For low-income workers, the drop in ESI coverage was split fairly
evenly between drops in own ESI coverage and ESI coverage through other
family members. For these workers, the decline in ESI coverage was offset
almost entirely by an increase in public coverage, leaving uninsurance un-
changed between 1999 and 2002 for the low-income workers.
In contrast, the drop in ESI coverage for middle-income workers was
due to a significant reduction in own ESI coverage (more than 4 percentage
points), offset by a small increase in ESI coverage through a spouse or other
family member (1 percentage point). The middle-income workers in 2002
were much less likely than similar workers in 1999 to have an ESI offer (down
2.5 percentage points) and, when they had an offer, to take-up ESI coverage
(down 2.6 percentage points).10 With the drop in ESI coverage among these
middle-income workers between 1999 and 2002, their uninsurance increased
by 2.2 percentage points. Thus, while uninsurance remained much more
common among low-income workers, the share of middle-income workers
facing uninsurance increased over the period because of a significant drop in
their ESI coverage.
For workers with higher incomes (incomes above 400 percent of the
FPL), there was virtually no change in overall ESI coverage and actually a
slight reduction in uninsurance. Therefore for the rest of our analysis, we focus
on the low- and middle-income workers who faced changes in their insurance
status over the period.
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Table 2: Characteristics of the Working Adults Aged 19–64, by Income
Group (Percentages, Except as Noted)
Characteristics










Age (years) 34.9 38.1nnn 0.5 0.4
Male 48.0% 53.1%nnn  0.3 0.3
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 51.5% 69.7%nnn  1.6  3.2+++
Black, non-Hispanic 17.1% 12.6%nnn  1.3 1.7+
Hispanic 27.1% 12.4%nnn 2.9++ 1.5++
Other, non-Hispanic 4.3% 5.3% 0.1 0.1
Is a citizen 81.5% 92.5%nnn  2.2++  1.7++
Education
High school or less 62.5% 46.8%nnn 2.5+ 1.3
Some college 27.1% 32.8%nnn  2.2++  0.4
Bachelors degree or more 10.4% 20.4%nnn  0.2  0.8
Family type
Single adult, no children 28.4% 27.7%  1.2 1.8
Single adult, with children 28.0% 13.4%nnn  0.4 0.5
Married adult, with children 35.0% 42.0%nnn  0.3  3.4+++
Married adult, no children 8.6% 16.9%nnn 14.0 2.0+
Risk averse 52.8% 56.6%nnn  5.6+++  5.1+++
Employment
Part-time worker 24.3% 14.0%nnn 3.0++ 1.6++
Full-time worker 75.7% 86.0%nnn  3.0++  1.6++
Has worked at least 1 year
at current employer
63.4% 78.3%nnn  1.6  4.4+++
Employer size
o25 workers 40.0% 29.6%nnn 3.3++ 3.4+++
25–99 workers 20.4% 19.0%  1.1  0.4
100–499 workers 17.2% 20.9%nnn  0.5  0.6
500 or more workers 8.4% 12.5%nnn  1.8+  1.7+
Government worker and other 13.3% 17.7%nnn  0.3  1.0
Industry
Construction 7.7% 7.9% 0.2 1.3+
Manufacturing 14.8% 17.9%nn  3.6+++  1.9+
Transportation/communication/
utilities
4.6% 7.2%nnn  0.7  0.1
Wholesale/retail trade 25.8% 18.9%nnn 3.0+++ 2.5++
Finance/insurance/real estate 2.9% 4.8%nnn  0.5  1.8+++
Services 36.5% 35.9% 0.7 0.4
Agriculture/forestry/public
administration
7.4% 7.2% 0.7  0.6
continued
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Changes in Worker Characteristics between 1999 and 2002
The level of ESI coverage in 2002 reflects the probability that the workers’
employers offer coverage and the probability that the workers take up that
coverage. Changes over time in ESI coverage could occur because of changes
in the characteristics of workers or their jobs, changes in employer’s likelihood
of offering ESI or changes in the individual’s likelihood of taking up an offer
when it is available. We begin by examining shifts in the characteristics of
workers and their jobs over the 1999–2002 period.
As shown in Table 2, we do see an increase in the share of workers with
characteristics that are known to be associated with a lower likelihood of ESI
coverage (Shen and Zuckerman 2003). These include increases in the shares of
low- and middle-income workers who are of Hispanic origin, who are non-
Table 2: Continued
Characteristics









Average ESI premium in worker’s county
of residence
Total premium for single policy (dollars) 2,759 2,786 703+++ 696+++
Worker contribution for single
policy (dollars)
438 458nn 133+++ 143+++
Total premium for family
policy (dollars)
7,054 7,137 2,019+++ 2,118+++
Worker contribution for family
policy (dollars)
2,012 1,977 520+++ 524+++
Spouse employment (for those
with a spouse)
Full-time worker 40.5% 58.9%nnn  0.4  4.0++
Part-time worker 12.6% 12.2% 0.4  1.7+
Potential insurance options
Spouse’s employer offers ESI 13.2% 30.9%nnn  0.7  2.1+
Eligible for public coverage 19.0% 5.2%nnn 5.6+++ 3.0+++
Nongroup premium (dollars) 3,223.00 3,948.00nnn 824.56+++ 410.87+++
Sample size 7,084 9,716 14,996 20,632
Source: 1999 and 2002 National Survey of America’s Families
Note: Income is defined as family income over the past year. Insurance coverage is defined as of the
day of the survey.
n, nn, nnnSignificantly different from workers with incomeo200% of FPL at the .10 (.05) (.01) level.
+, ++, +++Significantly different from 0 at the .10 (.05) (.01) level.
ESI, employer-sponsored insurance; FPL, federal poverty level.
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citizens, and who have low levels of educational attainment. Similarly, we see
an increase in the share of workers in jobs that have a lower likelihood of ESI
coverage (Chollet 1994; Gruber 2000). Between 1999 and 2002, there were
increases in the shares of low- and middle-income workers who were working
part-time, who had been at their job for less than 1 year, and who were
working for small firms. There was also a shift away from jobs in manufac-
turing industries to jobs in wholesale and retail trade, which are less likely to
offer ESI coverage to their workers.
Not surprisingly, the ESI premiums increased substantially between
1999 and 2002. Total ESI premium for single (family) policy was increased by
$700 ($2,100), to about $2,800 ($7,100) in 2002. The worker’s share of the ESI
premium also rose rapidly, with the worker contribution for a single (family)
policy increasing by about $140 ($520), to $450 ($2,000) in 2002.
The economic downturn has negatively affected the ESI offer from
spouse and the affordability of nongroup premiums. For low-income workers,
only 13 percent had a spouse with an ESI offer in 2002, and the nongroup
premium they were likely to face increased by $824 to $3,223. In contrast,
31 percent of middle-income workers can obtain coverage through a spouse
and they face an increase in nongroup premium by $411. Expansions in
public coverage somewhat offset these negative effects. The share of low-
income (middle-income) workers who were eligible for public insurance was
5.6 (3.0) percentage points greater in 2002.
What Explains the Change in ESI Coverage during This Period?
In Table 3, we use regression-decomposition methods to determine the extent
to which the changes in ESI coverage that occurred between 1999 and 2002
are explained by the changes in premiums and in the characteristics of the
workers and their jobs over the period, as opposed to other unobserved factors
(the regression coefficients for the models that underlie our decomposition
results are included in the Appendix). We examine changes in the probability
of an ESI offer and changes in ESI take-up for those with an offer. As the
change in the probability of having an ESI offer for low-income workers was
less one percentage point, we do not attempt the regression decomposition for
that outcome for those workers.
The first row of Table 3 shows the total difference in the probability of
workers’ having an ESI offer or taking up ESI coverage between 1999 and
2002. The next two rows separate the total differences into that which can be
attributed to differences in observed factors over time and that which is due to
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changes in other factors. The bottom half of the table separates the differences
because of changes in observed factors into the component parts: differences
because of changes in demographic characteristics, changes in employment
and job characteristics, changes in the alternative insurance options, changes
in total ESI premiums (for the likelihood of having an ESI offer) or the work-
ers’ contribution to ESI premiums (for ESI take-up by workers with an offer),
and changes in other characteristics of the worker’s county of residence.
We find that the reduction in the probability of an ESI offer for middle-
income workers is driven largely by changes in the observed characteristics of
workers and their jobs and, to a lesser extent, by demographic/preference
characteristics. Changes in the characteristics of the worker and their job
include reductions in the share of workers who are working full-time, reduc-
tions in job tenure, a shift away from manufacturing jobs, and a shift toward
jobs in smaller firms. In fact, changes in employment and job characteristics
alone accounted for an even greater reduction in the probability of an ESI
offer than was observed ( 2.6 percentage points versus the  2.2 percentage
points), while changes in demographic characteristics accounted for a  0.5
percentage point reduction
The negative effects on an ESI offer of the changes in worker and job
characteristics between 1999 and 2002 were mitigated substantially by the
changes in alternative insurance sources available to the workers. If workers in
2002 had the same alternative insurance sources available as in 1999 (i.e.,
same share of spouses with ESI offer, same level of nongroup premium,
same share of workers eligible for public insurance), we would have predicted
a 1.8 percentage point increase in the ESI offer rate. This result is driven by the
fact that our regression model predicts that workers in 2002 were more
likely to work for firms that offer coverage if their spouse did not have an ESI
offer or if they faced a high nongroup premium, a prediction that is consistent
with the conceptual framework. As a result, the decline in the share of workers
with a spouse with an ESI offer and the increase in the nongroup premiums
that the workers faced between 1999 and 2002 would be associated with
an increase in the share of workers with an ESI offer, all else equal. Although
ESI premiums increased over the period of our study, employers reduced
their share of premium contributions to offset their burden. Therefore
ESI premium change had a negligible effect on whether the worker had an
ESI offer.
By contrast, for ESI take-up for both the low- and middle-income work-
ers, changes in the ESI premium contributed by workers was the largest factor
in explaining the changes between 1999 and 2002, followed by changes in job
What’s Driving the Downward Trend in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance? 2091
characteristics. For low-income workers, we would have predicted a 1.9 per-
centage point reduction in ESI take-up based on the changes in ESI premiums
alone. Changes in the nature of the jobs (such as industry type and employer
size) accounted for another 0.9 percentage point reduction in ESI take-up. The
availability of an alternative insurance source accounted for an additional 0.3
percentage points of the reduction. That difference is mitigated somewhat by
changes in health care market characteristics of the county of residence, and
other unobserved market factors.
For middle-income workers, changes in the observed factors would
predict a 2.8 percentage point drop in ESI take-up between 1999 and 2002,
whereas the observed drop in ESI take-up is 2.6 percentage points. Similar to
the low-income worker sample, changes in ESI premiums alone would
account for 74 percent of the explained variation (predicting 2.1 percentage
points drop in ESI), and job characteristics would account for another 15
percent of the explained variation (predicting another 0.4 percentage point
reduction).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The recent economic downturn shifted many workers from full-time to part-
time work, from work in manufacturing to wholesale/retail trade, and from
long-term jobs to jobs with shortened tenure. At the same time, premiums in
both the ESI market and the nongroup market rose substantially. These
changes all contributed to the downward trend of ESI coverage over the 1999
and 2002 period.
We draw several conclusions from this study. First, while low-income
workers are more likely to be uninsured and are most vulnerable to the loss of
ESI coverage, many middle-income workers are also in a precarious position.
Uninsurance for middle-income workers increased between 1999 and 2002,
reflecting a loss in ESI coverage and a decline in the share of workers with
coverage options outside of ESI. Second, many low- and middle-income
workers have few coverage options in the absence of ESI. This is particularly
problematic for low-income workers: only 13 percent of them have a spouse
with an ESI offer and the nongroup premium they faced increased at a much
higher rate than that for middle-income workers. Third, the reduction in ESI
offers for middle-income workers between 1999 and 2002 was driven largely
by changes in nature of their jobs, while changes in ESI take-up for both low-
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and middle-income workers were driven largely by the rising ESI premiums
and to a lesser extent by changes in the nature of the jobs over this period.
There are three key limitations to this study. First, while we have made
an attempt to address the endogeneity of various insurance options by using
instrumental variables methods for public eligibility, using selection-corrected
nongroup premiums, and using firm-level rather than individual-level ESI
premiums, it is likely that our estimates retain some degree of bias. Second, we
do not capture any increases in job mobility that might occur if a firm stopped
offering ESI coverage. While we believe that this is likely to be small given that
we focus on lower income workers whose alternative job options are much
more limited than highly skilled workers, it nevertheless remains a limitation
of our model. Third, as noted earlier, we obtain estimates of the standard
errors of our decomposition results using a method proposed by Jann (2005).
While we focus on the point estimates in our discussion, it should be noted that
the confidence intervals around some of our statistically significant estimates
are quite wide. Replicating the analysis using a survey with larger sample sizes
(such as the CPS) would be a useful extension of this work.
With these caveats in mind, our findings suggest that policies that shore
up the ESI insurance system are important for both low- and middle-income
workers, as both are vulnerable to a loss of insurance coverage in the absence
of ESI. Over time, the potential coverage options available to low- and middle-
income workers in the absence of ESI have narrowed as nongroup premiums
have increased. While public coverage has provided some protection from
that increase for low-income workers, middle-income workers are much less
likely to have public protection. Further, as states scale back their Medicaid
programs in response to on-going fiscal problems (most notably, Missouri,
Oregon, and Tennessee), public coverage is disappearing as an option for
some low-income workers as well. With the continuing rise in premiums for
both ESI and nongroup coverage (KFF/HRET, 2004) and the call for sub-
stantial cutbacks in Medicaid as part of an effort to reduce the federal deficit
and address state budget gaps, it is likely that, in the absence of policies to
address the erosion in private coverage, uninsurance will continue to increase
for both low- and middle-income workers.11
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NOTES
1. Note that we can also use 1999 regression coefficients to obtain similar decom-
position results (this is what Oaxaca and Binder called the index number problem).
We chose 2002 as the basis for the regression model because we would like to
capture current behavior.
2. As with previous studies decomposing changes in insurance coverage, we estimate
linear regression models rather than the logistic or probit models that are more
commonly used for binary dependent variables because the linear model simplifies
the use of the decomposition method. As the coefficients from the linear prob-
ability model provide consistent parameter estimates for models with binary de-
pendent variables, the estimates from our decomposition approach will also be
consistent (Acs 1995).
3. We are limited in our ability to control for the full range of health and disability
measures that are likely to affect both eligibility for public coverage and the non-
group premium that an individual would face. NSAF provides only relatively
limited measures of health and disability status.
4. In addition, for a handful of workers who reported that they were ESI policy-
holders and that they had worked at their current employer for at least 2 years, but
did not report having ESI through their own employer, we recoded them to in-
dicate ESI coverage through their own employer.
5. We generate average county-level ESI premiums by multiplying the state-level
average premium for a specific firm size by the share of workers in that firm size in
each county (obtained from County Business Pattern Files), and summing across all
firm size categories for each county.
6. Specifically, Hadley and Reschovsky use the following demand-side variables to
identify their selection model (i.e., those were excluded in their second stage pre-
mium equations): whether a person has a spouse covered by Medicare, whether a
person is a risk taker, race and ethnicity, a measure of the generosity of the state’s
Medicaid/State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) eligibility rules for
low-income children, interacted with the presence of children and low income, and
the distance to the nearest safety-net provider.
7. We would like to thank Jack Hadley and Jim Reschovsky for providing their
coefficient estimates and other technical assistance to help us in generating our
estimates of nongroup premiums.
8. We would like to thank Amy Davidoff and Alshadye Yemane for providing the
eligibility measures.
9. It should be noted that the take-up measure here could capture an increase in the
rate of worker declinations of offer, an increase in the likelihood that employers are
offering coverage to some workers but not others holding similar positions, or a
combination of both. Unfortunately, there are no data that can be used to assess
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whether a change in the probability of eligibility has occurred during this time
period. While the Current Population Survey had been conducting an employee
benefits supplement to their February survey in odd numbered years that could
have answered this question, that supplement has been discontinued.
10. Given the ESI offer question that our analysis is based on, the decline in take-up
calculated here could be attributable, at least in part, to a change in the likelihood of
eligibility for an employer offer of ESI. If employers became more likely over this
period to offer coverage to only certain workers in a particular establishment, then
this would also be reflected as a decline in take-up, since take-up is computed as the
probability of have ESI coverage given a positive response to the survey’s offer
question.
11. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services established a
Medicaid Commission in May 2005 that has provided recommendations on op-
tions to achieve $10 billion in Medicaid savings (see http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
faca/mc/details.asp).
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